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renewed effect to the old judgment 77 but he is also free to pursue
the common-law remedy, by way of a writ of scire facias issued
in the original proceeding, if this would serve his purpose.7 A
difference in the language of the applicable limitation statute as
to the former,79 when compared with common law concepts regu-
lating the use of scire facias, had led the Appellate Court for the
First District to conclude that, while the mere institution of the
separate action in debt would be enough to prevent the bar of
limitation from operating, it was essential, for this purpose, to
carry the scire facias proceeding to completion before the dormant
judgment had actually expired, otherwise the attempted revival
would be ineffective. The Supreme Court, following the granting
of leave to appeal, reached an opposite result when it concluded
that there was no legitimate reason for differing rules in this
respect and that the simple institution of either type of proceed-
ing would be sufficient, if begun in ample time, to permit of the
eventual revival of the judgment.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
In the area of substantive criminal law, the only case of
consequence is that of People v. Riggins1 in which the Supreme
Court was called upon to interpret a special statute relating to
embezzlement.2 Therein, the defendant, a collection agent, entered
into an agreement to collect the delinquent accounts of the prose-
cuting witness and was given the right to deduct his commissions
from the amounts collected. Upon being prosecuted for failure
to remit the balance of the sums collected to the prosecuting
witness, the defendant argued that he could not be convicted of
embezzlement since he had an interest in the money. By way of
77 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 55.
78 Ibid., Ch. 83, § 24b.
79 Ibid., Ch. 83, § 24b, states that a civil action "may be brought" upon the judg-
ment "within twenty years next after the date of such judgment" and not after
that time.
18 Ii. (2d) 78, 132 N. E. (2d) 519 (1956). Schaefer, J. filed a dissenting opinion
in which Klngbeil and Maxwell, JJ. concurred, which appears at 8 Il. (2d) 78.
132 N. E. (2d) 928.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 210.
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answer, the court pointed out that the special statute compre-
hended that situation, and affirmed the defendant's conviction
notwithstanding the rule of construction which requires criminal
statutes to be strictly construed.
Turning to criminal procedure, it might be said that problems
preliminary to prosecution for crime are relatively rare but
mention could be made of the fact that, on questions relating to
extradition, the power of a court in connection with a request
for a writ of habeas corpus is not unlimited but is nowhere near
as narrow as that presumed by the trial judge concerned with
the case entitled People ex rel. Ponak v. Lohman.4 The trial
judge there limited the extradition hearing to matters of good
faith by the demanding state' and as to whether or not the
petitioner was, in fact, a fugitive. By so doing, he denied the
petitioner the right to question the validity of the requisition
papers and also cut off all inquiry into the matter of identifica-
tion, depriving the petitioner of all opportunity of showing that
he was not the proper person needed by the demanding state.
For these errors, the Supreme Court reversed the order remand-
ing petitioner into custody and directed that further inquiry be
made before the petitioner could be extradited.
Upon determination that prosecution should be instituted,
the state's attorney has the further duty to decide whether to
use an information or an indictment, the latter customarily being
used in felony cases.6 In the event the accused can be legitimately
prevailed upon to waive indictment, it should prove to be com-
forting to learn that the Illinois Supreme Court, through the
medium of the highly significant case of People v. Bradley,7 has
3 i1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 60. § 2, specifies four points concerning which
inquiry may be made.
47 Ill. (2d) 156, 130 N. E. (2d) 190 (1955).
5 This was error, as the matter of good faith cannot be inquired into by a court
after the Governor's warrant has been issued: People ex rel. Goldstein v. Babb,
4 Ill. (2d) 483, 123 N. E. (2d) 639 (1955).
6 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8, declares: "No person shall be held to answer . ..
unless on Indictment of a grand jury," but permits of an exception where the
punishment is "by fine, or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary."
77 Ill. (2d) 619, 131 N. E. (2d) 538 (1956). noted in 34 CGHIOAGo-KENT LAW
RFviEw 255.
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now upheld the validity of a statute authorizing the waiver of
an indictment in a felony case" so as to permit the prosecutor to
utilize the more expeditious method of proceeding under an in-
formation. In case an indictment is essential, however, the prose-
cutor must resort to the grand jury for its affirmative action and
may then run into problems with regard to the constitutional
rights of witnesses,9 particularly those witnesses who assert that
their right to be immune from possible self-incrimination be
respected. An attempt by the legislature, in 1953, to obviate such
claims led to the enactment of the so-called "Witness Immunity
Act," 0 but the holding in the case of People v. Burkert" would
indicate that the hoped-for reform in this connection has failed
to materialize. It was there said that, despite a recent trend to
the effect that the inability of a state to provide immunity against
prosecution elsewhere should not be enough to support a witness'
refusal to testify if assured protection against prosecution in
the state making the inquiry,12 the legislature had voted for total
immunity, hence the mere possibility of prosecution in another
jurisdiction would be enough to justify a refusal to answer, upon
constitutional grounds, to grand jury questioning.
The sufficiency of the indictment or information on which
prosecution was based became the subject of concern in four
cases, none of which could be said to be of particular significance
except to the person charged. In the case of People v. Lamphear,13
the defendant seized upon misgivings expressed by the court in
an earlier case,' 4 to the effect that a possible prejudice might
arise from the fact of the introduction of proof tending to dis-
close that the defendant was an habitual criminal, as reason for
S9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 702, as amended by S. B. No. 809, Laws
195, p. 1740.
9 I1. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 10.
10 I. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, C. 38, § 580a. The section was added by Laws
1953, p. 31.
11 7 Il1. (2d) 506, 131 N. E. (2d) 495 (1955), noted in 44 Il1. B. J. 711. Schaefer,
J., wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Hershey, Ch. J.
12 See annotation on this point in 38 A. L. R. (2d) 257, particularly p. 267.
13 6111. (2d) 346, 128 N. E. (2d) 892 ,(1955).
14 See People v. Manning, 397 I1. 358 at 361, 74 N. E. (2d) 494 at 496 (1947).
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an argument that, in cases of this character, two separate counts
should be used, one to charge the recent offense and the other
to state the facts as to the earlier criminal record. The Supreme
Court refused to accept this contention, preferring to follow the
traditional concept that the so-called "Habitual Criminal Act"
did not create a new and distinct crime but merely served to
aggravate the punishment for the most recent offense. 15 The
court did, however, again comment that the correction of defects
in the statute "which experience has brought to light" could
well be a matter for the attention of the General Assembly.'
6
The defendant in People v. Williams,17 took the quibbling
position that the words "did kill and murder" were not the same
as the single charge that he had "murdered" inasmuch as the
act of killing might have been no more than manslaughter or
even a justifiable homicide. His argument was refuted with the
brief comment that the indictment was in substantially the same
words as those used in the statute, 8 hence was sufficient for the
purpose. 9 In People v. Lobb,20 on the other hand, the Appellate
Court for the Third District concluded that an information which
charged the defendant with contributing to the delinquency of a
minor child was subject to a motion to quash for the reason it
did not specify one or more of the specific statutory acts which
the minor would have to perform in order to be classed as a
delinquent child21 even though it did state that the defendant had
procured intoxicating liquor for the child and had permitted the
minor to consume the same while riding in an automobile after
dark with certain male companions at a time when no parent or
guardian was present or consenting thereto. The court distin-
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1. Ch. 38, § 602, directs that the "former conviction,
or convictions... shall be set forth in apt words in the indictment." Italics added.
16 6 I11. (2d) 346 at 351, 128 N. E. (2d) 892 at 894.
177 Ill. (2d) 271, 130 N. E. (2d) 194 (1955).
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 358.
19 An indictment framed in statutory language is sufficient if the words used so
far particularize the offense as to inform the defendant, with reasonable certainty,
of the precise offense on which he stands charged: People v. Hamm, 415 Ill. 224,
112 N. E. (2d) 485 (1953).
20 10 I11. App. (2d) 125, 134 N. E. (2d) 353 (1956).
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 103.
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guished the case before it from earlier holdings to the contrary22
on the ground it was not possible to assume that the defendant's
conduct would "directly tend" to cause the minor to become a
delinquent, hence the information was said not to be precise
enough.
It is fundamental law that a defendant may be charged, under
separate counts in the same indictment or information, with a
series of separate crimes provided his acts, although but parts
of one common transaction, involve distinct violations of sep-
arate statutes or result in harms to different victims,23 but a
degree of care should be exercised, in this respect, to make cer-
tain that separate offenses have in fact occurred. It was neces-
sary, therefore, for the Supreme Court, in the case of People v.
Boyden,' to point out that the statute relating to unlawful prac-
tice of dentistry,25 while listing a series of forbidden acts by un-
licensed persons, describes only one offense by an unlicensed
person who is the "manager, proprietor, operator or conductor
of a place where dental operations are performed," hence would
not support separate convictions of such a person even though
his employees might commit a series of separate and distinct
offenses in the performance of varied dental operations at that
place. An information charging such a person with separate
crimes, each count being predicated upon a separate type of
dental service performed by an unlicensed employee, was there
held to be duplicitous and the separate sentences based thereon
were ordered reversed.
Conduct of the trial of a criminal case may call into account
a number of legal doctrines all directed to the end that the trial
may be a fair and orderly one without involving sacrifice of any
constitutional guarantees designed for the protection of the ac-
cused. Uppermost, of course, is the defendant's right to be
22 See, for example, the holding of the Appellate Court for the First District in
People v. Ostrowski, 334 Ill. App. 494, 80 N. E. (2d) 89 (1948).
23 People v. Dougherty, 246 Ill. 458, 92 N. E. 929 (1910).
24 8 Ill. (2d) 264, 133 N. E. (2d) 31 (1956), in part reversing 7 Ill. App. (2d)
87, 129 N. E. (2d) 37 (1955).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 91, } 60 et seq., particularly § 70.
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present at the trial26 but this right, like many others, may be
waived either expressly or by implication. It became a matter
of concern, therefore, for the Supreme Court to decide, in the
case of People v. Smith, 7 whether or not, when the record affirm-
atively showed the defendant's absence at a part of the trial,
such absence was a voluntary one on his part or was occasioned
by circumstances beyond his control. Noting that, in earlier
cases, the record disclosed not only the defendant's absence but
also that such absence was a deliberate one on his part, 8 the
court took the position that, for lack of an affirmative statement
in the record showing the absence to be a voluntary one, it had
to be presumed that the defendant's absence was one of involun-
tary character, hence required reversal of the conviction.
A limited degree of control over the disposition of the crim-
inal case has been vested in the local state's attorney by virtue
of his power to enter a nolle prosequi, but it has been noted that
his authority in this connection is subject to a degree of dis-
cretion on the part of the trial judge.29 The authority of the
Attorney General, on the other hand, at least with respect to
proceedings instituted by him, is not so limited. 0 The ,act of
a state's attorney in calling on the Attorney General for assist-
ance, 31 however, generated a problem as to whether or not the
limited or the unlimited right to nolle prosequi a criminal case
should control. A majority of the judges of the Supreme Court,
in. the case entitled People ex rel. Castle v. Daniels,3 2 took the
position that, upon entering the case, the Attorney General did
so with the full authority attaching to his office and not simply
as an assistant to the local state's attorney so could direct that
26 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 9.
27 6 Ill. (2d) 414, 129 N. E. (2d) 164 (1955).
28 See. for example, People v. Connors, 413 Ill. 386, 108 N. E. (2d) 774 (1952);
People v. Weinstein, 298 Ill. 264, 131 N. E. 631 (1921) ; Sahlinger v. People, 102
Il1. 241 (1882).
29 People ex rel. Hoyne v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315, 120 N. E. 244 (1918).
30 People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli; 415 Ill. 79, 112 N. E. (2d) 156 (1953).
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, § 4, specifies the duties of the Attorney
General, which duties include consultation with and advice to the several state's
attorneys and also, in unusual situations, to "attend the trial of any party accused
of crime, and assist in the prosecution."
32 8 Ill. (2d) 43, 132 N. E. (2d) 507 (1956). Davis, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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a nolle prosequi be taken, even without the discretionary ap-
proval of the trial judge. The latter, by means of an original
writ of mandamus, 33 was there ordered to vacate all proceedings
subsequent to the motion so made in the pending criminal case
and to permit the entry of a judgment dismissing the proceedings.
One further point with respect to the proper constitution of
the criminal tribunal might be noted. The defendant in the case
of People v. Noel 4 had been placed on trial with two others.
After a jury had been impanelled but prior to the introduction
of any testimony, the prosecution moved to withdraw a juror and
thereafter sought leave to strike the indictment as to all those ac-
cused except for the defendant. This was done and no objec-
tion was made by the defendant or his counsel. A trial was had
before the same twelve jurors as had been selected originally
and, following a verdict against him, defendant was sentenced
to the penitentiary. He sought reversal of his conviction on
the ground the trial jury was improperly constituted, arguing
it had been composed of eleven qualified individuals and one
stranger, hence violated his constitutional right35 without any
agreement on his part to accept a jury composed of less than
the normal number. 6 His argument proceeded on the line that,
since one juror had been withdrawn, the jury which heard his
case necessarily included one unauthorized added person. The
Supreme Court, however, held otherwise when it noted that, un-
less one juror had actually been called by name and had been
ordered discharged, the practice of withdrawing a juror was no
more than a fictional procedure necessarily designed to permit the
striking of an indictment without having jeopardy attach in
favor of those dismissed from the trial.
33 Issued pursuant to Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI. § 2. The power so granted is,
however, a discretionary one and only exercised in important cases. See Stanley
and Severns, "The Original Jurisdiction of the Illinois Supreme Court," 22
CHIcAGO-KENT LAw RZVMw 169-96 (1944), particularly pp. 180 et seq.
34 6 Ill. (2d) 391, 128 N. E. (2d) 908 (1955).
35 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 9.
36 A lesser number may serve if both the defendant and the prosecution consent
thereto: People v. Scudieri, 363 Ill. 84, 1 N. E. (2d) 225 (1936), noted in 15
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 65.
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The nature of the required and the permissible proof at the
trial of a criminal case is generally well understood but a year
never goes by without some new points being made. Proof as to
venue may sometimes be difficult to obtain, but the prosecutor
concerned with the case of People v. Jones3 7 solved his difficulty
by having the infant victims point out the precise spot where
the offense had occurred and by having older and more-informed
persons, then present, testify that the scene of the crime so des-
ignated was well within the county boundary. The Supreme Court
held the testimony so offered was not hearsay. In People v.
Walker,8 however, it was said that a charge that the premises
of Anthony Wright had been burglarized with intent to steal
personal property belonging to him and to Ophelia S. Wright
had not been made out when the sole witness to the point, who
said her name was Mrs. Octavia Wright, referred to the fact that
the apartment in question was occupied by her husband, without
naming him or in any way coupling Ophelia S. Wright with the
case. An argument to the effect that proof of a Christian name
is unnecessary 9 was rejected as being inappropriate where, as in
a burglary case, the ownership of the building is an essential
element.
Endeavoring to overcome the rule that evidence obtained by
an illegal search and seizure may not be used, over proper ob-
jection, to sustain a conviction, ° the prosecutor argued, in City
of Chicago v. Lord,4' that the ground for such rule had disap-
peared by reason of the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Wolf v. Colorado.42 The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, while recognizing the fact that the rule followed
in this state is the minority view on the point, refused to re-
treat from the previously established position, saying that while
376 Ill. (2d) 252, 128 N. E. (2d) 739 (1955).
387 Ill. (2d) 158, 130 N. E. (2d) 182 (1955).
39 People v. Smith, 341 Ill. 649, 173 N. E. 814 (1930).
40 People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N. E. 728 (1923).
417 Ill. (2d) 379, 130 N. E. (2d) 504 (1955), affirming 3 Ill. App. (2d) 410,
122 N. E. (2d) 439 (1954).
42 338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949).
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the Wolf case did not forbid the admission of evidence obtained
under an illegal search and seizure it did not require that such
evidence should be admitted. Brief mention could also be made
of the case of People v. Mikka43 for the reason it supplies still
another instance of the several exceptions which exist to the gen-
eral rule that evidence of the commission of another crime, un-
connected with the one on which the defendant stands charged,
would usually be improper proof.
Proper trial procedure became concerned in three other cases,
two dealing with instructions and one relating to the motion for
new trial. In People v. Galloway, a Negro defendant asked that
the jury be instructed, in the manner prescribed as early as 1854
in this state,45 that there should be no distinction made in law-
because of color. The prosecution sought to uphold a refusal
to give such an instruction on the ground that the principal wit-
ness for the prosecution as well as the police officers were also
Negroes but the Supreme Court, adverting to the fact that the
jury was composed entirely of white persons, very properly said
that the color of the principal parties in the case did not minimize
the fundamental legal principle involved, hence it reversed the
conviction.
On the basis of the problem presented in the case of People
v. Labiak,46 however, the court was able to say that no error had
occurred by a refusal to give a requested instruction which would
have permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of a lesser
offense for the reason that the two crimes originally charged 47
437 Ill. (2d) 454, 131 N. E. (2d) 79 (1956), noted in 31 Notre Dame Law, 717.
Certiorari has been denied: 350 U. S. 1009, 76 S. Ct. 656, 100 L. Ed. (adv.) 471
(1956).
447 Ill. (2d) 527, 131 N. E. (2d) 474 (1956).
45 Campbell v. People, 16 Ill. 17 (1854).
467 Il1. (2d) 583, 131 N. E. (2d) 633 (1956).
47 The indictment there contained two counts, one charging indecent liberty with
a child, a felony, and the other charging the misdemeanor of contributing to the
delinquency of a child. The second count was withdrawn at the close of the
evidence.
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were not merely degrees of the same unlawful act4 8 but were, in
fact, separate although related offenses."9
The Criminal Code of the state has, for a number of years,
contained a provision which declares that "all motions for new
trial and in arrest of judgment shall be made in writing."50
On the strength thereof, the Supreme Court said, in People v.
Jankowski,51 that an oral motion, particularly one which failed
to specify any precise ground, could not serve to preserve errors
which may have been committed and, in the event no written
motion had been presented, resulted in a waiver of such errors,
precluding the higher court from giving attention thereto when
review of the conviction was later sought. It was on this ground,
therefore, that the prosecutor in People v. Flynn52 relied when
he argued that, as the defendant's motions for new trial and in
arrest of judgment had been orally made and were lacking in
specification, there was nothing before the Supreme Court which
could justify it giving attention to the case. Despite this, the
court did grant review; first, because it noted that the prose-
cutor had made no objection with respect to the defendant's
failure to comply with the statute, but second, because it took
the position that, if the legislature had intended to penalize such
failure by precluding further review, it should have so stated.
The court did, therefore, expressly declare that it was overruling
the holding in the Jankowski case in this respect.
Procedures exist, at the time of sentencing, whereby the de-
fendant may secure consideration of a request for probation, 3
which procedures contemplate an investigation into the defend-
ant's background and the exercise of a degree of discretion on
48 See, in that connection, People v. Cox, 340 Ill. 111, 174 N. E. 64, 69 A. L. R.
1215 (1930).
49 Differences between the two crimes exist in that the offense of taking an
indecent liberty with a child is necessarily confined to sexual acts while that of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor might involve even non-sexual conduct.
Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 109, with ibid., §§ 103-4.
50 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 747.
51391 Ill. 298, 63 N. E. (2d) 362 (1945).
528 Il. (2d) 116, 133 N. E. (2d) 257 (1956).
53 fI. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 784 et seq.
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the part of the trial judge after a consideration of the report
made on such investigation. 54  It was, therefore, urged as a
ground for reversal of the conviction obtained in the case of
People v. Hamby55 that the trial judge had erred when he re-
fused to delay action until a proper investigation had been made
and had summarily announced that persons who were found
guilty of selling narcotics were "certainly never entitled to pro-
bation or any consideration from the court" 6 The Supreme
Court, however, took the position that, while a less summary
disposition of the matter would have been more consistent with
proper judicial administration, no error had occurred as the trial
judge had given regard to the serious nature of the offense and
had ascertained that the defendant had lied at the trial, hence
it was not unreasonable that the defendant should suffer the
penalty imposed by law.
In two cases arising under the Post-Conviction Act 57 the court
experienced little difficulty in finding a violation of the rights
of the person accused so as to require a reopening of convictions
which had earlier been obtained. Thus, in Brown v. People,5" the
court was able to say that it was the trial judge's responsibility,
in the event there was reasonable ground to believe the accused
was insane at the time of trial, 9 to make inquiry into the point
and his refusal to do this amounted to a denial of due process.
Similarly, in McKeag v. People,60 it was held proper, for this
purpose, to take into consideration the fact that a promise had
been made, but had not been fulfilled, to make a recommendation
as to the sentence if the defendant would plead guilty. The fact
that the recommendation, if made, would not have been binding
54 People v. Donovan, 376 Ill. 602, 35 N. E. (2d) 54 (1941).
55 6 I1. (2d) 559, 129 N. E. (2d) 746 (1955).
56 6 Ill. (2d) 559 at 563, 129 N. E. (2d) 746 at 749.
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 826 et seq.
588 Ill. (2d) 540, 134 N. E. (2d) 760 (1956).
59 The fact of probable insanity was brought to the attention of the trial judge,
after trial had begun, when defendant's court-appointed counsel stated that his
observation of his client led him to believe the defendant was not in his right mind
and was unable to co-operate with counsel. A motion to adjourn the trial so that
defendant could be examined by a psychiatrist was denied.
607 111. (2d) 586, 131 N. E. (2d) 517 (1956).
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was said to be a matter of no consequence in determining the
fairness of the trial leading to the earlier conviction.
By far the most significant of the decisions in the field of
criminal law achieved during the year, one which had and will
have important repercussions not only in Illinois but in other
states, springs from the problem considered by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the post-conviction proceeding en-
titled Griffin v. Illinois.6 1  The matter arose because Griffin and
another defendant, following conviction, sought review and, for
this purpose, being indigent persons, asked the trial judge to
see to it that they were furnished with a stenographic record
of the trial proceedings.62 The request was denied, so they did
nothing further to secure review by the ordinary writ of error,
under which review would have been confined to the common law
record. Instead, they then proceeded under the Post-Conviction
Act, charging a denial of constitutional rights, which petition
was dismissed without hearing. Following the affirmance of this
dismissal by the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendants then
obtained a writ of certiorari and thereby put the federal court
in a position to decide whether all defendants, those who were
financially able and those who were not, were entitled to have
a full review of their convictions and, for this purpose, were also
entitled to have the benefit of a publicly provided transcript in
the event they were too poor to provide the same at their own
expense.
A majority of the United States Supreme Court,6" seeming
to rely on an argument drawn from the right of defendants to
the equal protection of the laws, reached the conclusion that
it was the obligation of a state, if it permitted full review as to
61351 U. S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. (adv.) 483 (1956), noted in 30 Temple
L. Q. 61, and 34 Texas L. R. 1083.
62 As they had not been convicted for murder and sentenced to death, they were
not entitled to the benefits of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 769a.
63 The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Black, was concurred in by Chief
Justice Warren, and by Justices Douglas and Clark. Justice Frankfurter wrote a
separate concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Burton, with Mr. Justice Minton, wrote
a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justices Reed and Harlan. Mr. Justice Harlan
also wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
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some convictions, to see to it that full review was, in some way,
made open to all. The Illinois Supreme Court acted promptly
to effectuate the decision so attained,6 has now provided a rea-
sonable opportunity within which all persons convicted prior to
the date of the federal court holding may secure the benefit
thereof,65 and has also indicated that it will not automatically
apply doctrines relating to waiver and res adjudicata to those
whose convictions have heretofore been reviewed under the com-
mon law form of record. 6 It is to be expected, therefore, that
the work of the court in connection with reviewing convictions
in criminal cases will, for a time at least, become an onerous re-




The year's most celebrated decision in the area of domestic
relations was that of Nudd v. Matsoukas,l wherein suit was in-
stituted by an unemancipated minor against his father to recover
for injuries suffered in an automobile collision between a vehicle
operated by the father and that of another. Although the father 's
actions were alleged to have been wilful and wanton in character,
the trial court sustained a motion to dismiss on the ground that
a minor could not maintain an action against his parent, which
decision was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First Dis-
trict.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged the fact
that the only justification for refusing an infant a right of action
against his parent is that such litigation creates family strife.
However, it took the position that the social benefit derived
thereby was not sufficient to deprive a minor of redress for in-
64 On June 19, 1956, the court adopted Rule 65-1; S. H. A., Ch. 110, § 101.65-1.
65 Such persons have until March 1, 1957, to procure relief.
66 See, in particular, the holding in People v. Griffin, 9 Ill. (2d) 164, 137 N. E.
(2d) 485 (1956), not in the period of this survey.
67 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 780%.
17 Ill. (2d) 106, 129 N. E. (2d) 699 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 333, 5 DePaul L. R. 302, 44 Ill. B. J. 840, 1956 Ill. L. Forum 147, 10 South-
western L. J. 91, and 42 Va. L. R. 687.
26 Ill. App. (2d) 504, 128 N. E. (2d) 609 (1955).
